2019 KINCADE FIRE
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Sonoma Operational Area and the County of Sonoma
Department of Emergency Management

March 2020
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOPE</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNAPSHOT OF THE KINCADE FIRE</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVACUATIONS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEATHER</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRENGTHS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: OPERATIONAL COORDINATION</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: ORGANIZATION, STAFFING, AND TRAINING</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: ACTIONABLE PLANS UNDERSTOOD BY ALL PARTNERS</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: PUBLIC INFORMATION IMPROVEMENT</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B: PG&amp;E POWER SHUTOFF AND KINCADE FIRE TIMELINE</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C: AFTER ACTION REPORT PARTICIPANTS</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On the evening of October 23, 2019, the Kincade Fire ignited in an area northeast of Geyersville in Sonoma County, California. The ignition coincided with an ongoing power de-energization event due to Red Flag weather conditions. As a result of the planning and proactive response to the series of power shutoffs, Sonoma County was well positioned for a rapid and effective emergency response.

This fire, occurring just two years after the disastrous 2017 Central LNU Complex Fire including the Tubbs Fire, generated a tremendous amount of concern throughout the County an aggressive response on the part of government and community partners. With the images of 2017 still fresh in the minds of residents and local officials, a commitment to respond to this threat in a resolute and actionable manner was evident.

Ultimately, the fire would become the largest fire of the 2019 fire season in California and the physically largest fire in Sonoma County’s history. Some key figures:

- The fire consumed 77,758 acres of land
- The fire was active for 13 days
- 374 structures were destroyed
- 60 structures were damaged
- Over 186,000 people were evacuated from their homes
- Close to 4,000 people would arrive at shelters
- 4 people were injured
- There were no deaths attributed to the fire!

While the Kincade Fire presented unique challenges to emergency responders and government officials, it also presented opportunities to highlight a number of improvements that have been made since 2017. Notably, the agencies responding to the Kincade Fire were already engaged in addressing the challenges and demands placed on them because of major electrical system power shutoffs. These power shutoffs created significant impacts on the community and on government’s ability to maintain continuity of operations and service delivery.

Throughout this process, this after action review (AAR) recognized a number of strengths that illustrate the progress made since the Tubbs Fire in 2017 and identified business practices that should be maintained. Among these are:

- Improvements in disseminating alerts and warnings to the public compared to previous incidents.
- County investments in the emergency management program proved effective and benefited the response.
- Increased attention and resources to ensure residents were alerted and informed of conditions.
- Planning and exercising efforts that the County conducted in preparation for the PG&E power shutoff events proved useful in multi-hazard response efforts.
- Community compliance to evacuation orders and preparation efforts exceeded those of prior incidents.
- The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) performed as a collaborative coordination center.
As with any incident, the Kincade Fire presented a number of items that still deserve refinement and ongoing attention. These areas of improvement focus on the systems, plans, and processes that drive emergency response activities instead of evaluating individual performance. Among the recommended improvements:

- A need for an improved understanding and integration of mutual aid assets for effective coordinated response.
- Refinements in information sharing and coordination among Operational Area (OA) jurisdictions, including state agencies, during emergency events and EOC activations.
- Ensuring that the EOC is staffed with personnel who have the appropriate authority to make critical decisions when needed.
- The on-going power shutoffs illustrated the need to continue a focus on continuity of operations and business continuity efforts for County operations.
- Continued investment in planning, inter-agency coordination, and support capabilities of the emergency public information role and the joint information system.
- Enhance planning and capacity building for shelter management activities.
- The EOC is limited in its capability and capacity to support large-scale or sustained incidents.

This AAR process and report are specifically aimed at examining the actions and events that occurred relative to the Sonoma OA. This includes the countywide coordination of response activities among jurisdictions within the County and mutual aid agencies. Additionally, this report examines the events surrounding the Kincade Fire with an understanding that there is an overlap with the response to the ongoing series of electrical de-energization events. The simultaneous nature of these events required the Sonoma OA to manage two complex incidents at the same time. This AAR process is not evaluating the efforts of the tactical field-based response to fire.

The assessment process engaged a variety of stakeholders within the Sonoma Operational Area. Their contributions and participation are truly appreciated. The candid and transparent participation on behalf of Sonoma County officials allowed this review process to successfully evaluate the response in an unbiased fashion. As a result, this report has identified 19 findings and 64 recommendations.
Attempting to salvage possessions following the Kincade Fire inferno.
INTRODUCTION

The devastating 2017 Firestorm left Sonoma County and many of its neighbors with the harsh challenges that exist in today’s climatic “new normal”. Despite the overwhelming recovery ahead, the County immediately began to identify and implement improvements in its capabilities across all areas – plans, organization, equipment, training, and exercises. Knowing that another destructive event could be right around the corner, the County implemented a broad series of efforts to better serve the community.

It was clear that, when a fire sparked during a Red Flag warning on John Kincade Road northeast of Geyserville on October 23, 2019, the investments made by Sonoma County following the Tubbs Fire made a significant difference in their ability to respond rapidly, effectively, and confidently.

A number of factors influenced the outcome of the fire response. Among these are the fire behavior and affected geography, which provided a different set of variables in fire control, evacuation, and situational awareness than was experienced in 2017. The numerous PG&E power shutoff events leading up to the Kincade Fire required the County to test elements of their emergency management systems and processes. The proactive posture that the County embraced reduced response times and enabled greater and earlier communications with residents. The County’s investment in its emergency management program has resulted in more robust planning efforts, additional training and exercising of County staff, and greater emergency coordination capabilities.

While Sonoma County has made tremendous strides in program and system improvements, there are still areas that deserve attention to continue that trajectory to better serve and support the community during future incidents. Most of these considerations involve some level of coordination challenges among partner agencies. Continued development and socializing of standard processes will help mitigate these issues in the future.

This incident demonstrated valiant efforts to work collaboratively with agencies at different levels of government, community-based organizations, and residents. However, there are examples where the systems did not work as effectively as they could have. The AAR process provides a unique opportunity to examine how to continue to identify these challenges and refine additional improvements going forward. Each incident tests response systems in different ways, requiring a constant maintenance of these systems to ensure effective communication and coordination during incidents.
The State California has a mutual aid system that is the envy of jurisdictions across the nation and beyond. Systems and resources are in place to ensure communities have access to emergency responders and equipment from other jurisdictions across the state. The Kincade Fire saw the arrival of mutual aid resources accessed through the California Master Mutual Aid Agreement and under the Emergency Management Mutual Aid (EMMA) plan including additional firefighters, law enforcement officers, emergency managers, public information specialists, and other disciplines. The Kincade Fire saw some challenges with the ordering of resources and tracking the status of requested resources through EMMA, particularly among the cities.

Challenges also existed with the understanding of local road networks and County specific geographic characteristics that caused delays in mobilizing resources or created difficulties in decision-making. Mutual aid resources and assistance from the National Guard saw some difficulties in information sharing and clarification of authorities, roles, and responsibilities in the restriction of movement in evacuated areas.

While the areas of improvement listed in this report can help identify where changes can be made in systems, inter-agency coordination, and planning, nothing should take away from the exceptional work performed by any of the agencies involved in this incident.

Interviews conducted with County leadership, including appointed administrators and elected officials, reinforced the understanding and the agreement that great improvements have been made and this response was one of which to be proud. This was reinforced while reviewing results of community surveys to residents regarding their experience throughout this emergency. A general trend emerged showing that the majority of respondents felt the response was well managed and that they were appreciative of the communication efforts made by the County to keep them informed.

Shelters opened for evacuees using bi-lingual messaging.

### Scope

This AAR summarizes the County’s response to the Kincade Fire from the perspective of stakeholders, discusses preparedness measures the County undertook before the fire to improve its capabilities in all phases of emergency management (mitigation, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery), and evaluates the County’s overall response to the fire especially in areas supporting the whole community, noting strengths and areas for improvement.
This report covers the scope of the impacts that Kincade Fire had direct on the community. This report also recognizes that the Kincade Fire occurred during a period of frequent consecutive PG&E power shutoffs that had various significant cascading effects on an already burdened government organization and strained community. Therefore, many findings are cross-linked, and applicable to both events. A separate AAR for the PG&E power shutoffs captures the findings for those events.

While report is applicable to events occurring in the timeline for the incident (included in Appendix B), it recognizes the significant investments made by the County in preceding years. Although this report touches on some short-term recovery actions and provides recommendations on improving the County's recovery process (especially concerning restoring the community), it does not address the County's post-fire recovery efforts.

Methodology

To develop this report, Witt O'Brien's collected feedback from County departments, first responders, stakeholders, and OA partners using a variety of methods, including archival research and group interview discussions. Witt O'Brien's also reviewed County policies, plans, and procedures, as well as incident-specific documentation developed during the event, provided by the County. Finally, Witt O'Brien's reviewed the findings from Sonoma County Alert and Warning After Action Report (January 2020), and the results and analysis of four online surveys focused on the Kincade Fire and the PG&E power shutoffs deployed to the community, including two Spanish-language surveys.

The after-action review's goal was to allow full, open, honest, and frank discussions from all participants in a safe and comfortable environment. The following workshops and conference calls were held to gather information, in addition to surveys developed for those who were unable to participate:

- AAR Workshop
  January 16, 2020
  City of Santa Rosa Utilities Field Operations
  A list of participants is included in Appendix C.

- AAR Workshop – Executive Session
  February 18, 2020
  Sonoma County Administrative Office
  A list of participants is included in Appendix C.
• AAR – Public Information Officer/Joint Information Center (Phone Interview)
  February 5, 2020
  A list of participants is included in Appendix C.

• Surveys deployed:
  o Kincade Fire After Action Report Survey, deployed 2/4/2020, 8 responses
  o Combined Kincade Fire & PG&E Power Shutoff Survey for PIO Team, 4 responses
  A list of responders is included in Appendix C.

THEME

Sonoma County recognizes the improvements in disaster response capabilities of our communities that can be attributed to thoughtful, necessary investments in people, plans, and tools. Sonoma County wants to maintain that momentum and has the opportunity to continue to build upon those improvements with further investments.

SNAPSHOT OF THE KINCADE FIRE

The Kincade fire burned for 13 days, from October 23rd until November 6, 2019, when full containment was documented at 7:00pm. This was physically the largest fire in Sonoma County’s history, though less damaging than the October 2017 wildfires. The fire forced widespread evacuations throughout much of the County, causing more than 186,000 residents to evacuate during the peak of the fire.

The County of Sonoma proclaimed a Local Emergency on October 24 which was later ratified on October 31. Simultaneously, the Public Health Officer proclaimed a Health Emergency.

In total, the fire burned 77,758 acres, destroyed 374 residential and commercial structures, damaged 60 additional structures, and injured 4 confirmed fire personnel and civilians. Thankfully, there were no fatalities.

Moody’s Analytics estimates that the Kincade Fire cost about $620 million. This includes $235 million in lost economic output and $385 million in property damage.

The cause of the fire remains under investigation.

---

Evacuations

The rapid and continued spread of the fire resulted in massive evacuations over several days with evacuation orders being continually expanded and modified.

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) maintains primary responsibility for firefighting operations in the area in which the Kincade Fire ignited and throughout much of Sonoma County. Based on situational information, and in coordination with the Sonoma County Sheriff, CAL FIRE issued evacuation orders beginning on October 23 through November 2.

The evacuated areas would ultimately include most of the County, extending to the Pacific Ocean and to the northern portions of the City of Santa Rosa. The County was divided into zones for the purposes of organizing the evacuations (see chart below). Information flow and coordination of zone determination and evacuation considerations between CAL FIRE and the County was challenging. Mapping and consistency of geographic data between the IMT and the County proved difficult. The IMT lacked specific local knowledge including routes, local barriers, capacities of evacuation routes, and locations for evacuees to shelter.

Kincade Fire shown in red, mandatory evacuations in purple, and pending evacuations in tan demonstrate the extent of the County affected by evacuations on October 28, 2019. Santa Rosa lies in the center where the tan meets the purple area.

### CAL FIRE Evacuation Orders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Zones</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 23</td>
<td>Geyersville</td>
<td>874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 26 AM</td>
<td>1,2,3</td>
<td>44,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 26 PM</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,7</td>
<td>83,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 27</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10</td>
<td>186,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 28</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10</td>
<td>136,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 29</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10</td>
<td>133,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 30</td>
<td>1,2,3,5</td>
<td>3,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31</td>
<td>1,2,3,5</td>
<td>3,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The overlapping responsibilities of CAL FIRE and the County during evacuations demonstrate opportunities to develop improvements in shared decision-making and situation understanding. CAL FIRE holds the most accurate and current information regarding fire conditions and expected behavior. Additionally, during extreme fire behavior events, time is of the essence requiring rapid evacuation and public warning. The County has local knowledge of the geography, maintains the best Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping data, understands local planning efforts, and has established relationships with local jurisdictions. The County also has the capability and responsibility to provide public alerts, warning residents of impending evacuations and expected actions.

The need for effective coordination of evacuation information and decisions is further discussed in Findings 1, 2, 5, 6, and 10.

Weather

Leading up to the Kincade Fire, Sonoma County experienced periods of elevated temperatures, low humidity, and increased winds creating a greater fire threat throughout September and October. The National Weather Service issued heat advisories and Red Flag Warnings in both September and October. The National Weather Service issues Red Flag Warnings when warmer temperatures combined with low humidity and strong winds produce increased fire danger in the next 24 hours. Many of these periods of heightened fire threat resulted in Pacific Gas & Electric to de-energize electricity service to limit ignition sources from power lines.

October 2019 would generate a record four Red Flag Warnings, more than any other month in history. During periods between Red Flag Warnings, conditions rarely allowed for improvement of fuel moistures and fire risk. While temperatures would return to more seasonal highs, humidity levels remained extremely low, often in single digits. October 22 through 23 saw strong offshore flows from the northeast bringing drier, heated air to the area. These weather conditions continued through the first week of the Fire.
Weather Observations at Sonoma County Airport³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>High Temp</th>
<th>Low Humidity</th>
<th>Winds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 12</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 14</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 25</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 22</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 24</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12 mph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12 mph</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weather observations from the Charles Schulz – Sonoma County Airport demonstrate conditions that would promote active fire spread. The weather observations in the hills closer to the location of the Kincade Fire displayed even greater fire weather conditions that posed enhanced risk. These weather conditions further exacerbated the extreme fire behavior of the Kincade Fire during the first few days of fire activity. Winds in areas of Sonoma County would reach speeds in excess of a Category 1 Hurricane and would help push the fire great distances rapidly. Examples of the extreme weather observed in the area of the Kincade Fire included:

- Sustained winds of 49 mph and gusts to 75 mph on October 23 at the Healdsburg Hills
- Sustained winds of 50 mph and gusts to 71 mph on October 23 at Pine Flat Road
- Sustained winds of 61 mph and gusts to 68 mph on October 23 at Mt St. Helena
- Sustained winds of 78 mph and gusts to 103 mph on October 27 at Pine Flat Road
- Sustained winds of 67 mph and gusts to 85 mph on October 27 at Mt St. Helena
- Sustained winds of 38 mph and gusts to 65 mph on October 27 at the Healdsburg Hills
- Wind gusts of 55 mph at Pine Flat Road on October 30 and a relative humidity of 10%
- Wind gusts of 52 mph at Mt St. Helena on October 30 and a relative humidity of 13%

Northern California Fire Weather Outlook for October 27, 2019 showing Sonoma County in an Extremely Critical fire weather situation.
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the County learns from each disaster, the opportunity to improve various facets of response also strengthen the ability to anticipate, mitigate, and prepare to meet the challenges of Northern California’s “new normal.” This “new normal” is powered and magnified by a number of factors. Climatic circumstances may be driving the increased fire risk and potential for more intense fire behavior. The desirability of Sonoma County’s communities is resulting in increases in residential densities in higher risk areas. These factors increase geographic exposure and vulnerability but provide a basis from which to plan and prepare.

This section discusses the key findings for the County’s capabilities in planning for, responding to, and recovering from the October 2019 Kincade Fire.

Strengths

The following are the most notable strengths demonstrated by the County in response to the Kincade Fire. It is recommended that the County continue to foster and promote these strengths among its employees.

- Significant investments. The Central LNU Complex Fire in 2017 identified the need for the Emergency Management Director to have greater autonomy in decision-making and better communication with the County Administrator, who serves as the Director of Emergency Services. The County reorganized the Fire and Emergency Services Department, forming the Department of Emergency Management as an independent County department in July 2019, reporting to the County Administrator. The department is led by the Director of Emergency Management, who has the authorities of a Department Head.
  - In addition, the County has made significant financial investments in the emergency management program, including an emergency preparedness coordinator, supervisors, and alert and warning staff and tools, who played key roles in the response. In addition to simply having access to additional staff, this enabled a more rapid launching of emergency alerts enhanced ability to mitigate communication challenges.
• Solution-oriented strategic partnerships. Sonoma County assumed a collaborative posture going into the events of October 2019 including the PG&E power shutoffs, which extended to the response to the Kincade Fire. The County recognized the need to improve coordination within the OA, including with incorporated cities, government entities, and community-based organizations. The following are examples of partnerships that were strengthened and enhanced the County’s comprehensive situational awareness and increased capacity to respond:

  o Within the County organization, fire suppression agencies coordinated closely with the Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management and participated in the EOC activation. The fire suppression agency representatives provided a direct line of information sharing, the development of a common operating picture and increased the speed and rate of communication between the EOC and fire agencies working in the field.

  o The Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management provided a representative to the Incident Command Post to serve as a liaison and access point for situational information.

  o The coordination with the National Weather Service (NWS) proved to be extraordinarily effective and improved access to information needed to make critical decisions. The NWS identified the Kincade Fire ignition via satellite and was able to communicate this quickly to the already-activated EOC even before dispatch was notified of the fire. Additionally, the NWS provided a representative at the OA EOC which resulted in real-time information and the ready advice of subject matter experts.

  o The County had already engaged with partner cities earlier in the year to address ongoing de-energization planning efforts. This planning resulted in coordination and relationship improvements that were realized in the response to the Kincade Fire. The weekly meetings and calls improved the communications capabilities among all partners, and the County EOC leveraged the improved coordination to invite cities to participate in the EOC or regular situation status calls at the onset of the fire emergency. The City of Santa Rosa provided liaisons – Inspectors from the Santa Rosa Fire Department who understood the subject matter very well – to facilitate timely situation status information flow, and as a result, the City and County were aware of the operations and needs of one another. The County also saw an improved relationship with the cities of Windsor and Rohnert Park, and had direct contact with them through regular OA calls to obtain situational information. In turn, the cities had greater visibility into field operations, and situation status calls and reports allowed for an improved information flow to their elected officials, executives, and the public.

  o Overall, Sonoma County increased its ability to coordinate with external partners through OA situation status calls and participation in the EOC. External partners who participated in the Kincade Fire response included Cal OES, tribal, and nonprofit partners. All were better able to respond in support of Sonoma County. The enhanced coordination facilitated the ability to communicate critical incident and resource information. The increased participation of Cal OES assisted with the timely mobilization of state resources.
The OA and other external partners also had an opportunity to access the County EOC through the Duty Officer position, which improved coordination of information since 2017. The Duty Officer was available to OA partners 24/7 to access alert and warning capabilities and partners demonstrated a need and desire to access this resource.

Incorporated cities within Sonoma County also played a large role supporting one another. With support, situational awareness and communication regarding needs from the County, Petaluma was able to engage with the nonprofit sector and volunteers to provide shelter services to those displaced from Santa Rosa and elsewhere in the County.

The CAL FIRE plays a key role in wildfire suppression in State Responsibility Areas as established in the Section 4125 of the California Public Resources Code. CAL FIRE provided representatives to the Sonoma County EOC to serve as an additional communication channel for critical information.

The Tubbs Fire revealed the importance of community clinic partners in supporting the medical needs of shelter residents. Sonoma County seized on this valuable lesson and has been working to incorporate these important partners in the medical response through the pre-identification of roles and responsibilities and the development of MOUs and agreements.

The PIO team was prepared to provide robust, real-time, multi-format public information (see discussion below). However, due to the anticipated PG&E power shutoff, it was noted that the use of broadband internet connectivity and cell phones could be compromised. In order to perform this essential service, the County had previously established a contract with 211 to supplement information-sharing. As residents called the hotline, 211 was able to convey to the County what types of additional information residents were looking for and provided another source of situational awareness.

211 served the County throughout the emergency events adding augmented services that were both critical and a relief to strained resources. 211 was used extensively demonstrating the value of this partnership. 211 added an access point for multi-lingual assistance, provided an overflow for non-emergency calls going to 911, provided an additional resource for situational information, and aided in the control of rumors.

Lessons learned, not just documented. Sonoma County demonstrated the importance of learning from past events by incorporating many recommendations from previously observed areas for improvement, which ultimately led to an improved outcome during the Kincade Fire response. Building upon the increased level of collaboration and coordination discussed above, the following
are strengths that can be attributed to the County’s thoughtful approach to ensuring that lessons learned from past events are meaningfully practiced:

- The County Administrative Officer (CAO) authorized the activations of the EOC in preparation and early response to announced de-energization events. A key component of the de-energization plan is that the community needs to respond not only to the challenges posed by the loss of power but also to the threat of a simultaneous wildfire. Although EOC activations result in added costs, these activations placed the County in a better position to rapidly respond to escalating conditions. The EOC was active at the time of the ignition of the Kincade Fire, eliminating the time required to set-up and staff the EOC and speeding alert and warning communications.

- The County had engaged in routine Alert and Warning testing prior to the Kincade Fire, demonstrating success enhancing the County’s abilities in rapidly disseminating emergency messaging to the community.

- Many fire agencies anticipated the need for personnel and up-staffed accordingly, recalled off-duty personnel, and made strategic assignments at the field, DOC, and EOC levels, which represent enhancements from previous years. Additional personnel at various organizational levels and multiple disciplines were crucial to a timely situation status information flow.

- Fire strike teams and other resources were pre-positioned and financed by the County during Red Flag events providing additional immediate fire response capacity.

- Many elements factored into the success of the evacuation during the Kincade Fire, including the fire behavior and communications with residents that had already been taking place for the PG&E power shutoffs. However, the proactive, decisive, and early initiation of evacuation operations are what enabled the County to get out in front of the situation before circumstances worsened. Evacuation decisions were also effectively calculated to take place during daylight hours to avoid the panic and logistical issues observed in previous evacuations which took place in the dark of morning. Access to fire modeling helped to explain and justify the need for evacuations which ultimately gained greater community compliance. Evacuations of Windsor and Healdsburg resulted in almost 100% compliance. As areas were evacuated, fire crews were able to deploy quickly and effectively, which was critical for firefighting operations.

- The County rapidly engaged in disaster recovery and continuity of operations functions from the EOC early into the incident. This proactive approach allowed for processes and systems
to be utilized that best postured the County to address long-term solutions for the assurance that County services would continue uninterrupted.

- Situational awareness and intelligence improved with better access to modeling, weather satellite applications, field deployed cameras, and OA coordination activities. This resulted in more effective decisions while supporting greater confidence among the community.

**Preventing and reaching the whole community.** Sonoma County has prioritized preparing the whole community in its approach to emergency management. In addition to active outreach using public education messages and efforts that took place months before fire season, the community has been empowered through partnerships and preparedness initiatives to engage in planning for their own disaster response. Businesses and residents alike began paying closer attention to preparedness messaging throughout the year and the public messaging that was provided at the onset of PG&E power shutoffs. This is demonstrated through increased involvement in preparedness campaigns, including a call to action to sign up for SoCoAlert and making neighborhood-level plans for door-to-door notification to assist in evacuation efforts. Most importantly, public engagement with the County enhanced the community’s trust in public safety, and residents understood the meaning of “red flag warning” and were more likely to adhere when advised to comply with evacuation orders. Here are some ways that strengthened public information capabilities and contributed to the improved outcome of the Kincade Fire response:

- The PIO team, ranging in levels of experience and contribution, leveraged the experience gained through frequent activations to establish and practice specific roles and responsibilities within the PIO organization. As a result of the deeper bench of PIOs, they were able to staff the PIO function around the clock to answer media questions and develop messaging.

- Understanding the demographics of the population they may need to reach for incidents or disaster throughout the year, the Sonoma County PIO team requested translation staff in advance and were able to bring in two translators per shift. 100% of media releases, social media postings, and web site entries were available in English and Spanish.

- The PIO team anticipated the level of confusion and misinformation that occurs in a fast-moving and complex incident and understood the value of establishing a single resource for all official information to serve as a “one stop shop” for the public. Although the site, SoCoEmergency.org, was prepared and advertised to provide public information for the PG&E power shutoffs, the PIO team was able to quickly leverage the increased attention to the site and provide public information for the Kincade Fire, including evacuation and shelter information in real-time. The success of having this active site was measured by the increased hit rate and contact on social media posts directing to the site. The site ultimately saw over 6 Shelter operations included options for pets.
million views with over 500 thousand unique visitors. The PIO team proactively monitored hashtags across different social media channels to direct users to the official site.

- The PIO team anticipated the need for space in order to scale up their organization. Not having adequate space at the EOC and needing a dedicated location where their detail-oriented tasks needed to be performed, they requested and received a trailer equipped for the PIO function. The trailer was situated next to the EOC to maintain the close level of coordination and information-sharing.

- Those displaced were sheltered and supported. Sonoma County recognizes the inevitable need to provide mass care and shelter more frequently to residents and has made significant strides and investments in the ability to support the whole community in this mission area. Below are steps that the County has taken to bolster its ability to serve the community:
  - The Sonoma Human Services Department (HSD) has been steadily working on enhancing their capabilities, including shelter operations and management. Over 100 personnel have completed training to support this capability, including training to support those with disabilities or access and functional needs (AFN), and 27 staff have Functional Assessment Service Team (FAST) training. Having local, trained personnel enabled shelter set-up to support displaced residents to have immediate access to FASTs to support the AFN population, and allowed time for the County to request additional FASTs, as approximately half of the County’s trained personnel were themselves evacuated. In addition, the County moved the EOC AFN Coordinator position from the Operations Section to Management, which enabled greater access to decision-makers to advise and provide visibility on AFN issues. This alignment showed a noticeable improvement in the level of service provided to the whole community.
  - Recognizing that emergency shelters are not a one-size-fits-all solution, the County has developed a variety of sheltering solutions that address the needs of those with pets. The County was successful at sheltering pets in mobile units placed adjacent to shelter sites, or at shelter sites, if crated.
The medical support of displaced residents in shelters was largely provided by community partners through the development of Memorandums of Understanding. Community clinics helped fill these roles, as well as hospital available hospital staff. Prior to the fire, staffing and the teams were identified minimizing the logistics of locating of qualified staff.

Partnerships with neighboring jurisdictions throughout the County and the willingness of agencies to step up and fill gaps created by the fire proved crucial in ensuring adequate shelter space. Large-scale evacuations created stresses in the shelter system by limiting capacity as areas containing existing shelters were subsequently evacuated. Cities in Sonoma County not immediately affected by the fire took in displaced residents and took on the corresponding shelter management demands.

**Areas for Improvement**

The following are the most notable areas for improvement observed in the response to the Kincade Fire. Each area for improvement includes a brief discussion, findings, and associated recommendations for actions or steps the County may take to improve their emergency response capabilities and increase their disaster resilience.

**Area for Improvement 1: Operational Coordination**

An analysis of Sonoma County’s response to the Kincade Fire identified many issues commonly observed among the local government and OA levels of SEMS, as well as with state entities and with the myriad of key players and service providers within a county. This incident had many moving pieces that built upon areas of improvement identified following past events, and among them, operational coordination remains an area where capabilities require continuous attention and development. FEMA defines the Operational Coordination core capability⁴ as the ability to “establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.”

Observations from the Kincade Fire provide the County an opportunity to closely scrutinize the issues and gaps captured in the findings below and improve abilities to coordinate and collaborate with local, state, private, nonprofit and government partners for an improved outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finding 1:</strong> The response to the Kincade Fire saw an incomplete integration of resources, knowledge, and assets between CAL FIRE and Sonoma County for a coordinated response structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAL FIRE has primary responsibility for State Responsibility Areas (SRAs), including the area of the Kincade Fire and many other locations in or near Sonoma County, therefore had jurisdiction over incident response for the Kincade Fire. Irrespective of incident jurisdiction, local governments have special authorities and responsibilities for public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ Source: FEMA. [https://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities](https://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities)
Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

Safety, security, and recovery of their populations. Actions taken during the Kincade Fire demonstrate that when an incident expands from the wildland to the wildland-urban (or suburban) interface (WUI), all response agencies, including CAL FIRE and local governments, need to closely coordinate their efforts to share tactics, approaches, information, and data.

As Northern California becomes more susceptible to wildfire, CAL FIRE can be expected to continue to play a key response role alongside local governments. A mutual awareness must be established to ensure an understanding of each other’s roles, responsibilities, and authorities in order to enhance, and not hinder, each other’s efforts.

During the response operations, CAL FIRE Incident Management Team (IMT) assets from other parts of the state encountered several notable challenges in coordinating information which can be attribute to limitations or lack of local knowledge, including local road networks, geographies, and nomenclature. Correct pronunciation of the names of roads, communities, and areas is necessary to accurately communicate time-critical information, which would have been helped by a more integrated involvement of local resources or subject matter experts (SMEs). Misinterpretation of information was observed to delay response actions.

*Use the same map projections.*

As wildfire behavior dictated the need for evacuations, CAL FIRE determined the areas for evacuation with input from the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office, working ad hoc to establish zones on a manual map. This information was provided to County GIS to record and develop digital maps for both planning and public information purposes. However, there was inconsistency between the physical map assets and the digital geospatial information tools, and some specific location-based information was found to be out of date, inaccurate or missing altogether. In addition, CAL FIRE and the County were not using the same shape files when creating evacuation plans. The County had more specific, localized data and shape files to aid in evacuation routing and planning, but they were not used by CAL FIRE incident management team. The County GIS team was at the EOC and was not co-located with CAL FIRE at the Incident Command Post.

The shelter list provided by CAL FIRE did not match the County’s data which caused confusion. The County list only identified shelters supported by the County, while CAL FIRE included organizations that were operating shelters not part of the County’s sheltering activities and the County could not vet. Because these lists were not coordinated and validated against each other, and both provided as public information
### Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Clarify and refine the roles and responsibilities and jurisdictional authorities of local governments within the OA and CAL FIRE to enable effective, efficient, and uniform integration of response authorities, information, and data, including in a State Responsibility Area (SRA) fire.</td>
<td>Establish protocols in coordination with CAL FIRE for the consistent and effective sharing of incident information, geographic data, and projections of expected incident activity (including potential areas of evacuation) between the Incident Command Post (ICP) and the OA. Evaluate the use of an Operational Area-wide “GIS Cooperative” or “Joint Geospatial Information System” model to coordinate and share data and resources (Sacramento County GIS Cooperative is an example). For major fire incidents, consider incorporating local GIS into the Incident Command Post to support mapping and alert &amp; warning.</td>
<td>Based on lessons learned and past experiences, inventory the datasets, lists, and types of information that are commonly found to require coordination with CAL FIRE. Compare the datasets, lists, and information against those used by the County to validate common assumptions and identify discrepancies. Resolve discrepancies with CAL FIRE and document results. This applies to but is not limited to maps/GIS data and shelter lists.</td>
<td>Establish procedures and necessary agreements with local fire agencies and CAL FIRE to ensure that the Department of Emergency Management Staff Duty Officer is notified of critical fire incidents based on such criteria as weather conditions, power shutdown events, number of resources initially dispatched, and/or call type. Further, these procedures should include processes for a representative from the Department of Emergency Management to be dispatched to the ICP to initiate coordination activities, gain situational awareness and potentially support alert &amp; warning efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Finding 2: A disconnect remains between Sonoma County, the OA, and local governments causing gaps in coordination and information-sharing.

Despite the many strengths observed in the County’s ability to support and coordinate with cities, some challenges remain. These challenges can be partially attributed to the role served by the County government in the OA concept, where the County government is the lead agency of the OA. The lead agency has responsibilities that are
Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

in addition to the County’s emergency response responsibilities, including coordinating information, resources, and priorities among local governments within the OA, including County government and regional partners.

This challenge can also be partially attributed to the independent and individual character of each city within the County, all of whom are important assets to the Northern California tourism and agricultural industries.

In many instances, information and resources that serve cities are coordinated through the County because of organizational alignments, such as health services and schools. While this complies with SEMS, often cities are left out of the loop on critical information they need for their own planning purposes. Examples include:

- Hospitals are located throughout the County, including in cities, but coordinate through official channels through the Medical Health Operational Area Coordinator (MHOAC) through the Sonoma County Department of Health Services (DHS). When hospitals evacuate, cities need to understand the process and timing; what services will no longer be available; system impacts; locations and routing of evacuation; and if the facilities can be used for alternate purposes. The current information sharing process does not give cities sufficient visibility into this.

- Schools serve the entire County, including cities, but coordinate directly with the Sonoma County Office of Education (SCOE), and cities are not typically part of the information flow. Schools organizationally have a direct connection to the County structure while having a direct service and community impact to the cities.

Recommendation 2.A: As part of the next revision of the County/OA Emergency Operations Plan, refine the OA concept of operations for Sonoma County, spending some effort defining the relative statutory authority (and limits therein) between the County and local governments. Consistent with relevant authorities, define roles and responsibilities, communicate them to local government partners, and exercise them. Consider the potential for building out the concept of sub-regional hubs in which County staff augment city EOCs to support the influx of residents from unincorporated areas.

Recommendation 2.B: Continue to strengthen a culture of communication, coordination, and collaboration with cities across all sectors to promote information sharing and enhance relationships. Initiate routine non-event calls and meetings to
## Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

Coordinate, understand mutual resources, needs, and capabilities. “Shake hands now, so you’re not pointing fingers later.”

**Recommendation 2.C:** Establish or improve the communication protocol with cities; clarify information flows (e.g., hospitals to DHS) with all parties and review how pertinent information regarding hospital status, closures, evacuations, and resumption of services is shared.

**Recommendation 2.D:** Continue to build the communication protocol with cities; clarify information flows (e.g., schools to Sonoma County Office of Education) with all parties and review how pertinent information is shared regarding school status, including operability, closures, damage, and resumption of services.

**Recommendation 2.E:** Refine the roles of the liaison function and municipal representation in the OA EOC. The County and the cities must jointly be active participants in receiving, sharing, and analyzing situational information to include overlapping jurisdictional impacts.

### Finding 3: The private sector must play a greater role and have better representation in emergency planning.

The private sector is robust within Sonoma County, and has a tremendous capacity to support the community during both response and recovery. Businesses play a key role in maintaining a viable supply chain and provide a sense of normalcy to residents experiencing disaster. The County needs to have situational awareness of what businesses are available, and which types of commodities or services are limited or unavailable, to be able to anticipate the services they will need to provide to the public.

It is also understood that businesses have economic drivers that may affect their priorities and operations. In an emergency situation, life safety is the first and most important priority. This needs to be clearly communicated to businesses that may choose to operate in the face of danger.

The current Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) (2014) does not establish a clear pathway for private sector participation in their emergency management organization and in the EOC. The EOC organization includes a Liaison Officer, however, in an incident of significance, the liaison role is not typically focused on private businesses. Rather, the EOP points to the local governments as points of coordination for the private sector and recommends including representatives in their EOCs. However, large-scale events can greatly benefit from the inclusion of a representative for the business community in the Sonoma County OA EOC to aid in information-sharing and coordination of resources.
### Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

Emergency planning in collaboration with the business community should include: potential resources that can be made available, supporting of businesses to minimize economic disruption, management of supply chain integrity, and access to business locations behind controlled access points. The Kincade Fire demonstrated challenges with permits issued to businesses to enter controlled areas. The permits were often not recognized by National Guard or Law Enforcement personnel restricting business operators from conducting business. The restriction of business operations will have tremendous financial impact on most businesses adding to further economic recovery challenges.

**Recommendation 3.A:** Establish a Private Sector Workgroup with appropriate representation from the County organization and invite private sector participants to take part in coordinated planning efforts. Consider the use of aggregating groups like Chambers of Commerce, the Sonoma County Vintners association, and others to capitalize on existing communication networks.

**Recommendation 3.B:** Expand the Liaison Officer position in the EOC to include a Private Sector Liaison position to be staffed by a representative of the private sector community.

**Recommendation 3.C:** Establish a new or refine the re-entry permit system for access into evacuated areas for business owners and employees. The procedures should ensure agencies making re-entry decisions and those controlling access understand and acknowledge authorized re-entry permits and the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of agencies participating in access control.

**Recommendation 3.D:** The County should consider ensuring the Department of Emergency Management has the resources necessary to adequately incorporate public-private partnerships before, during, and following disasters. Consider an additional staff position to focus on private sector inclusion in emergency planning, supply chain management, access to businesses during incidents, pre-incident planning assistance to private entities, guidance in private-sector business continuity, maintaining resource inventories, and providing leadership in community economic recovery.

**Finding 4:** Agencies responsible for emergency management lack understanding about the American Red Cross’s role, responsibilities, capabilities, and expectations which continue to challenge the mass care and shelter capabilities of the County.
Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

The American Red Cross (ARC) is a key player with significant capabilities and resources for operating emergency shelters. However, it is often unclear how to use them effectively as a resource. Their internal rules governing mass care services can conflict with the goals of local government, and issues often arise from the differences of practical approaches to meeting the needs of the shelter population. In addition, the timeline for their activation is often dependent on the availability of volunteers and resources which often proves challenging.

Local governments often lack specific understanding of their statutory authorities and corresponding responsibilities, especially in Sonoma County. The historic reliance on the American Red Cross erodes that understanding since the organization has managed to respond more robustly in the past.

The scope of the incidents that have struck Sonoma County and other jurisdictions across the state have demonstrated the enormous demand placed on mass care and shelter. Systems and processes need to be developed and maintained that support a multi-organizational solution to the management and operation of emergency shelters. Expectations that one entity will be able to handle these incidents is simply not realistic. Mass care and shelter requires a greater focus on inter-organizational coordination, communication, planning, training, and exercising.

Another key issue for Sonoma County, is the availability of emergency shelter to chronically unhoused populations. As communities struggle with developing solutions to homelessness, considerations must be made at every shelter activation for appropriately meeting the needs of the whole community. When the County coordinates shelter operations with the ARC, there must be a mutual understanding of policies for case managing homeless clients and how shutting down shelters will effect this population. Additional considerations for sheltering unhoused clients are contained in Finding 11.

**Recommendation 4.A:** Establish a broader understanding of ARC organization and capabilities. Define and document authorities, roles, and responsibilities. Define and document the communication protocols. Define the coordination structure between the ARC and the County.

**Recommendation 4.B:** Expand the opportunities to train and exercise mass care and shelter with the County, cities, and the ARC to improve the common operating picture, improve communication, and enhance inter-organizational understanding. This will further improve understanding of the authorities, roles, capacities, and constraints among each of these entities.
Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

**Recommendation 4.C:** Establish or refine the OA Care & Shelter Annex, plans and procedures to ensure consistency of approach towards shelter management. When local agencies initiate shelter operations to be relieved or augmented by ARC or another community partner, it is essential to ensure a smooth transition. Included in these considerations should address the specific concerns related to the handling and sharing of shelter client information.

**Finding 5:** Additional efforts to coordinate with out of county law enforcement mutual aid, including the California National Guard (CNG), are needed to ensure the ability of Disaster Service Workers (DSW) to access appropriate areas to support emergency response.

The CNG was responsible for staffing checkpoints and setting up barricades to cordon off evacuated areas to prevent unauthorized access to off-limits facilities. However, many non-sworn County and city personnel, serving as DSWs, had to access areas for their emergency response assignments and were denied access.

Local government staff that experienced restrictions from entering evacuated areas included personnel responding to staff EOCs or other incident support activities. Communicating needs, authority, personnel identification and other factors were found to be difficult and at times non-existent between the local agencies and the CNG command structure.

There appears to be a disconnect between local government law enforcement, mutual aid and the CNG with the application of barricade management and access control during evacuation and reentry activities. There does not appear to be a plan in place addressing the reentry or repopulation of evacuated areas to ensure access control is addressed in a coordinated fashion consistent with EOC objectives. This issue additionally extends into Finding 3 and Recommendation 3C addressing the access and permit considerations for private business owners.

Plans should clearly describe evacuation and reentry controls to provide guidance to mutual aid assets. There is no state level plan, process, or procedure that supports communication between out-of-county law enforcement mutual aid or military resources to inform their personnel of decisions or authorities of local officials during evacuation, barricade management, and reentry. In a review of the *State of California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan* (the Blue Book), the *State of California Law Enforcement Guide to Emergency Operations* (the Red Book), and *Critical Incident Response Plan*[^5], there was found to be insufficient details to support out of county

---

Findings and Recommendations: Operational Coordination

resources for wide-scale evacuation, access control, barricade management, and reentry nor a process to support a local jurisdiction who lacks sufficient planning in this area. The Adjutant General (TAG) is included in those rare instances where National Guard resources are needed to support law enforcement in evacuation and reentry.

The operational roles of these agencies are well defined and deserve additional development when included in mutual aid activities in other jurisdictions. As the authority for peace officers is clearly defined in California penal Code § 830 et seq., including the CNG when called upon by the Governor, the operational guidelines regarding their support in evacuation and reentry is less developed. This adds friction to the system. This is not a scenario that occurs often, yet demands attention to mitigate future occurrences. The lack of clear plans, processes, and guidelines for evacuation, barricade management, and re-entry are further compounded by pressures placed on elected officials by the public and the effects of technology such as the “ring camera” found in Finding 13 creating “armchair situational awareness,” or false assumptions of actual conditions due to limited information.

Recommendation 5.A: The Department of Emergency Management should work with the Sheriff to develop a means of appropriate County-generated identification for non-sworn staff that establishes the authority of the bearer to be recognized as performing official emergency business.

Recommendation 5.B: The Department of Emergency Management, as the OA Coordinator, and the Sheriff as the OA Law Enforcement Coordinator, should work with the Chief of Cal OES Law Enforcement Division, the California Highway Patrol Commissioner, and The Adjutant General on law enforcement mutual aid support to local government evacuation, barricade management, and reentry efforts. This coordination effort should result in a clarification of authorities, coordination channels, roles, and responsibilities in multi-agency evacuation and reentry events managed by a local jurisdiction.

Area for Improvement 2: Organization, Staffing, and Training

The County workforce is the first line of defense in addressing the demands that disasters place on organizations. The recent events that have impacted Sonoma County provided clear pictures of the effects that are placed on employees. Staff are all too often personally effected by the disaster, forced to experience personal loss, displaced from their homes, or becoming stranded. These situations reinforce the necessity for government to dedicate considerable effort to develop continuity into business practices, develop depth in staffing capabilities, and ensure procedures exist to effectively utilize the
whole organization and partners where necessary. In particular it was found that focus needs to be placed on the organizational capacity and staffing issues related to the EOC, DOC’s, the JIC, COOP, and in support of shelter operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings and Recommendations: Organization, Staffing, and Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finding 6:</strong> The presence or representation of personnel with sufficient authority is necessary for decision-making in the EOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapidly expanding incidents, especially those that occur during non-work hours, require quick decision-making with minimal interruption in search of approvals. When discipline-specific responses ramp up, senior personnel from relevant departments must be available to provide policy and procedural guidance with insight and direct department resources as necessary to support incident response. Decision-making for these departments cannot be made by emergency management staff. Developing a comprehensive list of statutory authorities for the County government and the agencies responsible for implementing them would be the first step. Emergency contacts lists including agency representatives, which are familiar with the department’s statutory authorities would need to be included.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendation 6.A:** The Department of Emergency Management should work with the County Counsel’s Office and County departments to develop a more comprehensive list of statutory authorities for the County government and the agencies responsible for implementing them. Emergency contacts and agency representatives who are familiar with the department’s statutory authorities and can speak on behalf of the department with the authority to commit resources. A similar exercise should be performed with special districts that overlap the County’s unincorporated area. |

**Recommendation 6.B:** Departments need to define thresholds that support their role in an emergency regardless of whether the EOC is activated, to ensure they are engaged early and can respond with their resources effectively. For incidents requiring evacuation, ensure a representative with sufficient authority from the Sheriff’s Office is present in the Operations Section. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding 7: The County’s Disaster Service Worker (DSW) program should be evaluated and reinforced to ensure that sufficient personnel are available to perform duties in an emergency in various circumstances and conditions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The simultaneous occurrence of the Kincade Fire and the PG&amp;E power shutoffs had unique consequences on the ability of the County’s personnel to perform their roles as DSWs and ensuring the continuity of operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Findings and Recommendations: Organization, Staffing, and Training

Some personnel were evacuated for the fire and had to seek alternate lodging or shelter at a time they were scheduled to work, both in disaster response and day-to-day roles. Others experienced their work report locations being evacuated due to the fire or shutoff because of de-energization and were unable to perform their duties. Confusion arose because there was lack of visibility of personnel status, largely due to compromised communications channels and unclear policy regarding the responsibility to report to work. As a result, the County observed that personnel were not re-tasked efficiently to support the EOC where they could have alleviated some of the strain on those working multiple shifts. This put an inequitable burden on those who were activated and had a disparaging effect on personnel morale who felt that tasks should be more equally spread out amongst employees.

**Recommendation 7.A:** The Sonoma County Human Resources Department should evaluate the efficacy of the current delivery of its orientation of the DSW program to new hires at onboarding to ensure that personnel adequately understand their responsibilities in a disaster. The Department of Emergency Management should be a close partner in that training development and delivery, especially when addressing the authorities and corresponding limitations, especially when considering DSW badge identifications and seeking access to closed areas. Finally, a refresher curriculum should be developed and delivered for employees periodically.

**Recommendation 7.B:** As part of the evaluation of the DSW program, the Human Resources Department should review and refine policies for compensation, based on employment categories, for overtime and stand-by labor for activities related to disaster work.

**Recommendation 7.C:** As part of the evaluation of the DSW program, the Human Resources Department should establish policies for compensation when facilities and alternatives critical to performing employment functions are unavailable, which may include re-tasking personnel as DSWs.

**Recommendation 7.D:** As part of the evaluation of the DSW program, the Department of Emergency Management in coordination with Human Resources should evaluate options for providing lodging or shelter to personnel who are displaced by the incident and are critical to supporting the incident.

**Recommendation 7.D:** As part of the evaluation of the DSW program, the Human Resources Department should provide policy guidance to departments for determining and reporting employee status. This should be a part of each department’s COOP as well.

**Finding 8:** Current staffing levels for personnel serving in the emergency management organization, including EOC, DOCs, and PIO team, are unsustainable for long-term activations and require the bench of available resources to be deepened.
Findings and Recommendations: Organization, Staffing, and Training

County personnel activated for a succession of events, some concurrent, experienced expected burnout. Staff were extraordinarily dedicated, to the point of personal consequences in the form of exhaustion and inability to care for family members. It is a best practice both to fill primary and alternates for each EOC/DOC/PIO team position and also to cross-train employees on different roles and responsibilities. At times, 24-hour operations must be sustained for many days, subjecting personnel who normally work regular 8-hour shifts to an unfamiliar 12-hour schedule. For small teams, such as the PIO team, this means working consecutive 12-hour days. To support personnel in a safe and sustainable work environment, the County should have adequately prepared staff who are familiar with the various roles and can capably rotate through shifts and assignments.

The County should also be prepared to engage staff resources outside of their own organization. This may include scoping out Master Service Agreements with other organizations and contracts with vendors to provide emergency services support on an on-call as-needed basis, establishing requirements and processes for Emergency Management Mutual Aid (EMMA) requests, and establishing parameters for trained volunteers.

**Recommendation 8.A:** Conduct a review of staffing based on requirements outlined in the Emergency Operations Plan and experiences gained during EOC activations. Identify needed positions and determine the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for each position. This will facilitate the identification of staff or external personnel to fill these positions.

**Recommendation 8.B:** Long activations may require personnel work in roles different than their usual day-to-day or disaster roles. Develop a strategy and plan to cross-train and re-task personnel as DSWs for assignment to disaster-related roles.

**Recommendation 8.C-1:** Clarify the EMMA request process and refine procedures for requesting EMMA support, including how to support local governments within the OA with resources. As part of a plan to engage EMMA resources, establish clear responsibilities and resources for logistical support for EMMA resources. Communicate challenges with Cal OES during the event, steps being taken locally, and support needed by the office.

**Recommendation 8.C-2:** Explore with Cal OES the ability to view resource request status statewide in order to have sufficient visibility and situational awareness about specific resource requests submitted that can be communicated within the OA. This would allow local government emergency managers to understand timing, resource availability, logistical support of requested resources, and to ensure proper coordination with their elected officials and executives.
### Findings and Recommendations: Organization, Staffing, and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Recommendation 8.D:</strong></th>
<th>Develop Master Service Agreements with other organizations that include the scope for positions that may be filled, as appropriate, and specify compensation issues.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation 8.E:</strong></td>
<td>Develop scopes of work for positions that may need to be contracted or assigned to trained volunteers to meet the emergency response objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Finding 9:** | County personnel need additional training to expand their care and shelter capabilities. |

The County recently reorganized the EOC and moved the Care and Shelter Branch from the Logistics Section to the Operations Section. This organization was observed to work well, however the new structure has not been trained on or exercised prior to the Kincade Fire, so communication pathways had not yet permeated to the field level.

The County observed successes in deploying trained personnel to support Functional Assessment Service Teams (FAST) assessments for shelter residents with disabilities and others with access and functional needs. However, roughly half of the 100 trained personnel from HSD were displaced by evacuations, which hindered their ability to provide services. The County requested FAST assets through the state, and they had to be provided from out of the area, delaying their services.

**Recommendation 9.A:** Develop a training to orient EOC and field level care and shelter staff on the new organization of the Care and Shelter Branch and establish a communications pathway and workflow from the EOC to the field. Develop and deliver an exercise specific to the care and shelter capability.

**Recommendation 9.B:** Expand opportunities for FAST program training for HSD personnel.

**Recommendation 9.C:** Expand opportunities for shelter operations training for HSD personnel.

### Area for Improvement 3: Actionable Plans Understood by All Partners

Exercise procedure improvements to get all partners on the same page – having current plans in place and being able to train and exercise against those plans would improve process coordination.

FEMA defines the planning core capability as the ability to “conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or tactical-level approaches to meet defined objectives.”
## Findings and Recommendations: Actionable Plans Understood by All Partners

### Finding 10: The County does not have a functional evacuation plan and repopulation plan.

During the Kincade Fire response, evacuation planning was done ad hoc, with CAL FIRE and Sonoma Sheriff’s Office representatives making decisions in real time based on emergent information and wildfire behavior. However, they were not supported by established procedures for defining evacuation area parameters, communicating information to the public, managing the movement and placement of evacuees and managing evacuations within a common operating picture. These activities occurred and were coordinated ad hoc, as well.

Based on this evacuation and repopulation experience, a simple, flexible, and functional evacuation plan is needed to enhance the County’s capabilities and improve the public safety outcomes of future evacuations. Several key issues were evident that should inform the development of the evacuation and repopulation plans:

- Authorities, roles, and responsibilities need to be documented and communicated to all parties involved in evacuation operations, including CAL FIRE, County Sheriff’s Office, City Police Departments, Department of Emergency Management, the County Administrator, and the Health Officer. They should include approval and decision-making authority for different jurisdictions and a mechanism for coordinated decision-making and messaging when evacuation operations cross jurisdictional boundaries. Staff serving in EOC management roles have key incident coordination and operational roles during evacuations and need to ensure adequate training and guidance documentation is provided regarding evacuation authority and operations.

- Establishing permanent evacuation zones (the same geographic boundaries that would always evacuate regardless of incident type or conditions) do not address the diversity and evolving nature of emergencies. While establishing evacuation zones serve well as a basis for evacuation planning, there remains the need to allow operational flexibility and adjustment to address current situational conditions. There will always be incidents where tactics require response strategies that utilize different geographies and strategies to evacuate people. Additionally, establishing permanent zones may give residents incorrect information and false expectations during incidents that require a deviation from pre-planned evacuation zones. This requires a public outreach and education effort so that residents better understand their role in evacuation and don’t go into the next fire season assuming they are located in a particular zone that will only evacuate as a zone.
The plans need to include an understanding of the modes by which people will evacuate – by personal vehicle, transit, on foot, paratransit, or needing assistance – and provide an analysis of available routes and their capacities.

A plan with a process for defining zones and how to manage them needs to be developed. It will also need to provide strategies for managing the placement of evacuees, such as assembly areas, pick-up points, and means of transporting to a shelter.

Evacuations of hotels were found to be a particularly complicated in terms of population size, impacts to concentrated numbers of cars hitting transportation corridors, and lack of an efficient means for the government to communicate with them. Tone-coded squelch radio receivers, similar to weather radios were referenced a best-practice in Hawaii and worth exploration.

Three key issues that require improvement were observed during repopulation:

- The speed at which elected officials desired to repopulate took precedent over standing Health Officer Orders. Public health and safety did not appear to factor in as a priority. An option of limited entry with a narrow scope could have been allowed due to health concerns from debris, ash, hazardous materials, and others. This suggests that a playbook for County elected officials is needed to ensure that all County officials, elected and staff, have input into the system and are working towards the same goals at the same time.

- Housing conditions were not thoroughly considered when repopulating. As shelters closed and residents returned to their homes, many discovered that they were still de-energized and found themselves in the middle of freezing weather with no heat. This was especially dangerous for seniors, people with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs. This reinforces that repopulation must happen methodically, quickly, and safely.

- Public information regarding repopulation took place through several different mechanisms, and residents came across conflicting information from the County, cities, and other entities.

**Recommendation 10.A:** Develop an evacuation plan that is simple, functional and can be scaled up or down depending on the incident. The evacuation plan should contain considerations for those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs.

**Recommendation 10.B:** Perform an analysis of evacuation operational activities and determine what support is needed from the EOC for evacuations.
Recommendation 10.C: Develop repopulation strategies that include considerations for public health and safety in a variety of conditions, including a public information strategy. Repopulation strategies should contain considerations for those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs.

Recommendation 10.D: Develop a comprehensive inventory of evacuation resources including transportation providers, number of assets, capabilities of transportation assets, ability to accommodate accessibility for those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, consideration for pets, drivers capable of operating transportation resources, and contact information of resource providers.

Recommendation 10.E: The Department of Emergency Management should develop a playbook identifying County elected officials’ roles and responsibilities in an emergency or disaster.

Recommendation 10.F: The Department of Emergency Management should outreach to the lodging industry to invest in tone-coded squelch radio receivers or encourage the use of NOAA Weather Radios.

Finding 11: The County does not have a care and shelter plan and corresponding support tools that include a thorough consideration for those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs.

Sheltering operations for Kincade Fire evacuees faced many challenges, including the secondary impacts of PG&E power shutoffs, which left multiple prospective shelter sites unable to activate due to de-energization. Evacuations were a moving target dependent on the wildfire behavior and emergent information.

Planning for mass care and shelter requires extensive effort and identification of needs, capabilities, and methodologies. The management of shelters including the logistical resourcing of shelters requires substantial pre-event planning addressing sites, accessibility, feeding, security, public messaging, children, equipment, supplies, and agreements, are among numerous other considerations. The considerations in each of these factors demand greater attention in incorporating the service needs to those individuals with various access or functional needs.

A Countywide shelter group was mentioned in the AAR meetings, but it is unclear if it is active, who is managing it, and the membership. Resolution of these factors with an active membership could help solve some of the confusion between the County and the cities. It could also be a forum by which to better address the questions discussed previously about the resources and availability of the American Red Cross.

There was also an independent process for communicating shelter availability by CALFIRE that was outside of the County process managed by DHS. This led to inconsistent
and inaccurate information shared with the public. The authority of the County and DHS as the delegated agency needs to be reviewed with CAL FIRE and appropriate mechanisms for inclusion in the County’s common operating picture.

**Recommendation 11.A:** The role of the Countywide shelter group that exists currently is unclear, and it is not widely shared as a resource. As a result, there is a mismatch between expectations and capabilities. The role of the County-wide shelter group should be formally defined and documented in a workgroup charter to provide a baseline for coordination within the County. The cities and appropriate non-governmental organizations should be actively recruited and engaged by the County.

**Recommendation 11.B:** The existing shelter inventory should be reviewed and revised to document discrepancies or changes as well as to identify shelter sites that have back-up generation capabilities for future de-energization events.

**Recommendation 11.C:** Capabilities related to providing care and shelter services to populations with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, should continue to be developed and formally documented in a care and shelter plan to provide specific and clear procedures and policies for shelter workers. This includes the establishment and documentation of communication pathways between FAST program support and the EOC to prevent delays in situational information and resources.

**Recommendation 11.D:** Explore the unique considerations for the chronically unhoused population when they utilize the services of emergency shelters. This population will need a different set of social services and support inside a shelter and when the emergency shelters close; this may impact the decision to close the shelter.

**Recommendation 11.E:** The Mass Care and Shelter Plan needs to have procedures for communicating shelter information with CAL FIRE and other cooperators. It should include a means for a common operating picture.

**Finding 12:** Elected officials have a unique role in an emergency and information-sharing due to their emergency authority and a special relationship with constituents.

It was observed that local government emergency response activities, including the public information function, and the elected official-constituent information exchange did not exist in a vacuum.

By its sensitive nature, incident-specific information must be carefully considered and framed for consistency before being release to the public. Adding an external channel
that is outside the scope of the Joint Information System (JIS) has the potential to introduce misleading, inaccurate, or inconsistent information to the public.

It’s important to understand the activist nature of elected officials and recognize their eagerness to meet their constituents’ needs, in order to mitigate potential pitfalls with the development of plans, procedures, and mechanisms. Plans, policies, and structured guidance to steer communications can provide opportunities for the elected-constituent information-sharing channel to enhance situational awareness, in an appropriate manner and not hinder the dissemination of consistent public information.

**Recommendation 12.A:** Expand and refine an intra-jurisdictional communications plan that addresses providing accurate, timely, and crafted situational awareness to elected officials, including through EOC liaisons (see Recommendation 6.A). The plan should also include a mechanism for elected officials to communicate any critical information they gather from the community and integrate it into the common operating picture.

**Area for Improvement 4: Public Information Improvements**

Lack of coordination leads to a tremendous potential for inconsistency, misinformation, and confusion.

FEMA defines the Public Information and Warning core capability as the ability to “deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.”

*The Alert and Warning capabilities are covered separately in the Sonoma County Kincade Fire and PG&E power shutoff Alert and Warning After-Action Reports.*

**Findings and Recommendations: Public Information Improvements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding 13: The PIO team faced several novel hurdles resulting from the concurrence of the PG&amp;E power shutoff event and fire-related evacuations. Lessons learned should be used to continue to refine the PIO team organization, roles and responsibilities, and procedures.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With the speed of technology advances and the public’s accessibility to public information and social media, the County’s responsibility for providing information, including public education, social media messaging, and official messaging, has grown significantly over the past few years. The County is accountable for insuring that</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
accurate, official, and verified information reaches the public in a timely manner. As this need grows, the County should continue to invest in the physical assets and human resources of the PIO team, and continue to refine roles, responsibilities, and assignments to meet incident needs.

**Recommendation 13.A:** Define clear roles and responsibilities for PIO team members, including their responsibility as a DSW, which may require working the night shift. The previously recommended DSW orientation (see Recommendation 7.A) should include this expectation. Consider refining the current EOC PIO plan.

**Recommendation 13.B:** Refine the PIO team concept: Expand the size of the PIO team, cross-train members, and include PIOs from County departments to ensure a variety of public information roles can be filled when needed. Identify additional staff that are not currently assigned as PIOs throughout the County organization who have skillsets that can assist and augment the PIO team staffing needs.

**Recommendation 13.C:** During disaster response, establish specific roles and responsibilities for each member of the PIO team at the beginning of each shift and ensure an equitably shared workload. Ensure that the scope of the assignment is reasonable and sustainable. PIOs assigned to the EOC need to be allowed to focus on their assigned EOC roles in support of the incident. Departments that are contributing staff to the EOC, including PIOs, should coordinate with the Department of Emergency Management and the COOP Team when department needs are going unmet due to EOC staffing.

**Recommendation 13.D:** Throughout the incident, evaluate the need and ability for scaling up the PIO organization to meet specific incident needs, especially in functions that generate large volumes of information that demand consistency. Examples include:

- Establish a communications pipeline as soon as a shelter is opened to both provide and gather information, including information regarding access and functional needs. Assign member(s) of the PIO team to Care and Shelter. The status of pets separated from shelter residents would be another data point. The PIO team should also consider that survivors that are shelter residents will feel isolated from the event without regular news, and may turn to unofficial sources, such as social media and home monitoring devices (e.g., Ring cameras), and gain incomplete or inaccurate information. Delivery of official public information is the most effective way to manage this type of information and dispel rumors. A Care and Shelter PIO would create a solid pathway to support survivors with accurate information to assist them with transferring to independent living.
• Assign multiple PIOs to disseminate social media content, whereas only one person may be needed to do social media monitoring and rumor monitoring.

**Recommendation 13.E:** During incident response, visually document all EOC PIOs with names, emails, and phone numbers of the lead PIOs and the secondary task leaders/managers. It should be who to talk to about assignments and/or approve press releases and public messaging.

**Finding 14:** The use of social channels and smart technology may result in the inadvertent receipt of inaccurate or misleading information that may have adverse consequences to life safety and public perception.

The prevalence of social media has made access to information and the demand for it greater than ever. Furthermore, social media creates a sense that people are viewing a common operating picture because they are able to synthesize the information they receive through various platforms, when in fact they may be isolate bits and pieces of a larger picture. This has the potential to create false information and an incomplete record of facts creating a dangerous situation for individuals.

For example, individuals monitoring social media networks or Ring doorbell cameras, which can be viewed remotely through a mobile application, may have provided the false impression that their homes and neighborhoods were safe for return. However, the reality was that the immediate area outside of their home was safe, but it was actually neither safe to get to nor stay in.

Local officials can be subjected to criticism due to the misperception of speed of decision-making based on such incomplete and inaccurate information.

Public education around the limitations and dangers of using unofficial social media sources as primary sources of information is an important component to reducing the impacts on public safety and negative public perceptions that can arise. Emergency officials cannot make decisions about life safety based on social media, and that the public should not derive conclusions about evacuation, repopulation, and other life safety issues from social media and technology.

The County can reasonably anticipate that displaced individuals and those at mass care locations will be looking for any indication for safe return to their homes, so messaging to address this must be proactive and immediate at shelters and other mass care sites, including PG&E Community Resource Centers (CRCs).

**Recommendation 14.A:** Develop a robust public education component of the PIO plan (or public education campaign) including crisis communications message development that addresses the appropriate use of social media for situational awareness and
identify trusted sources of information. The plan should identify how the public gains elements of information regarding critical incident information such as evacuation and re-entry. Include pre-incident public education and messaging needed during a response, including immediate messaging to shelters, CRCs, and other mass care sites.

Finding 15: Translation of messages into Spanish was done by multiple personnel throughout the incident which resulted in inconsistent and confusing word use for technical terms.

Various translators working with Spanish language messaging used different levels of terminology, resulting in inconsistent and confusing messaging. The PIO team observed a need to balance grammatically proper translations and more accepted ways to convey concepts. In general, the same terms should be used throughout the incident.

Recommendation 15.A: Work with community groups to develop situational awareness about how best to communicate with certain language categories. For example, there may be Spanish language speakers from a wide variety of countries that process the same information differently due to their cultural lens. Develop a lexicon of common technical terms in Spanish that are often used and easily understood that is cross-cultural, such as terminology used for safety and damage assessments, healthcare, public safety, public works, debris, and other disaster response operations in order to increase comprehension and deepen the connection to the various Spanish speaking groups.

Recommendation 15.B: Develop a capacity through agreements and partnerships with vendors or community organizations to improve the delivery of bilingual messaging to a diverse community.

Finding 16: The County’s current Joint Information Center (JIC) concept has significant gaps and misalignments in coordination, which resulted in unacceptable delays of information release.

The JIC, as it functioned for the Kincade Fire, encountered operational challenges coordinating with city partners. The fast-moving circumstance created the occasion for misalignment of expectations and capabilities between County operations (whose PIOs have the authority to make decisions and expedite messaging) and city partners, who have a separate approval process. The public information priorities did not align, but due to the co-location, the various public information entities were unable to disconnect and address their priorities independently. Finally, it was observed that some PIOs were following routine processes for message approval that do not apply during an emergency. Public safety agencies have this authority on behalf of their
jurisdictions, so it is unclear why their approval process would be different during a disaster.

Although best practices indicate that local governments should participate in the OA JIC, it is clear that in Sonoma County, this concept needs to be refined with operational roles and responsibilities defined and documented. The relationships among the various public information organizations need to be coordinated in greater depth as well, so city and County partners are able to collaborate effectively without hamstringing each other’s operations.

**Recommendation 16.A:** Establish an Operational Area-wide PIO working group to discuss issues and develop strategies in advance of an event to improve coordination with cities and not hinder future performance.

**Recommendation 16.B:** Refine the JIC concept and develop a JIC plan and/or charter to address roles and responsibilities, a concept of operations for how to work with city partners and share information, and how to integrate into the CAL FIRE JIC. Examine various models and practice communication protocols to determine the best fit for the OA.

**Recommendation 16.C:** The recommended JIC procedures (Recommendation 13.B) should include specific agreements between participating jurisdictions to support delegated authorities to approve expedited public information messaging and reduce the potential for having to obtain approvals as per the routine manner.

**Finding 17:** Elected officials in Sonoma County tend to have an expectation of frequent and immediate public information releases to meet constituent requests; however, that expectation is unrealistic and unsustainable.

The PIO team experienced significant pressure from the County Board of Supervisors to respond to frequent requests to push out public information. However, the official source of information for the fire – CAL FIRE – only puts out official public information every 12 hours. Additional sources of information are observation-only and are not considered official. There is an understanding that the public will be interested in information more frequently, and may go to unofficial sources that provide unconfirmed, misleading, or incorrect information. Avoid pushing redundant information through multiple sources, which dilutes the ability of “government” to speak with one voice.

**Recommendation 17.A:** In the recommended JIC procedures, establish a schedule for public information releases. Emergency Public Information releases are separate from
Area for Improvement 5: Additional Investments Needed

The Kincade Fire identified a number of areas that should be considered for future investment. Emergencies require substantial equipment, facilities, and supply needs to carry out the incident objectives. To ensure that shelters can accommodate diverse populations, unusual or uncommon material goods and equipment may be needed. Facilities that support the management of the incident and ensure effective inter-organizational coordination such as the EOC, must be able to adequately accommodate the people and equipment required to carry out the mission. While there is always a balance between adequately preparing for future disasters and ensuring day-to-day jurisdictional needs are being met, considerations must consider the challenges that exist in actual emergencies and the limitations that present themselves in emergency events.
## Findings and Recommendations: Additional Investments Needed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding 18:</th>
<th>There were unmet needs for durable medical equipment and shelter resources, especially for supporting those disabilities and others with access and functional needs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More medical cots were needed than were available for sheltering operations. Furthermore, they were not managed and reserved for those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs. In some cases, able-bodied shelter residents were able to commandeer cots dedicated for medically fragile populations, believing that they were simply more comfortable beds which were available on a first come, first served basis. Additionally, there were not enough available blankets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 18.A:</td>
<td>Procure, develop contracts with vendors, or develop MOUs with organizations to provide durable medical equipment required in shelters to support the general population and those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 18.B:</td>
<td>Ensure that shelter procedures recommended previously (Finding 11, multiple Recommendations) include guidelines for assigning reusable specialty equipment like Durable Medical Equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 18.C:</td>
<td>Ensure that shelter procedures recommended previously (Finding 11, multiple Recommendations) include guidelines for estimating supplies like blankets and how to order additional supplies should the incident expand beyond the capacity of local stores for shelter equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finding 19: The EOC facility has insufficient space and equipment to manage expanding EOC activations, especially when COOP activities and/or scaled-up public information efforts are required.

Sonoma County is aware that the EOC facility is insufficient in size, as identified as an area for improvement in the 2017 AAR and are exploring all options to solve this issue.

Enhanced COOP activities, such as employee status tracking and reassignment, facility relocation, and the fulfillment of essential functions, have no unified location to take place in a coordinated manner when the EOC is activated. The COOP team requires a separate space from the EOC organization but with access to the EOC to ensure the continuity of functions of County services, however, the most seamless manner of coordination for the COOP team and EOC is for the two functions to be closely located to share information in real-time.

Similarly, the PIO team currently does not have adequate space in the EOC, which hinders their ability to produce coordinated content and work in tandem with the EOC. As a workaround during the Kincade Fire, the PIO team was established in a trailer in the EOC parking lot to be close to the EOC but have a dedicated space where they are able to focus. This was a significant improvement from past activation but was not perceived to be an ideal long-term solution.

Recommendation 19.A: The County should continue to explore all possible options to construct a new, state of the art EOC to meet its desired operability, communications, and support goals.

Recommendation 19.B: Construct or reserve a dedicated space for the PIO team, co-located with the EOC, to fit the following parameters:

- Fits up to 20 people
- 2 monitors per work station
- Monitors on walls that are capable of displaying information, social media feeds, local news etc.
- White boards
- Space for media briefings

Recommendation 19.C: Consider the need for additional space for larger incidents when the PIO needs to be larger and a JIC is activated, to meet the increased workload and the EOC workspace is rendered insufficient, which should be exceptional, not routine. Expanding the amount of space dedicated to the PIO Team should be coupled with reconfiguring the team distribution and using the additional space for larger staffing requirements for media and social media monitoring and
supporting the field PIOs when they are not in the field. The PIO staff for the EOC should be focused on integration of the PIO function with EOC operations and manage internal EOC communications. Expansion space could be achieved through a portable office trailer delivered to the EOC or through reuse of other County office space as a more distant satellite location. In either case, workflow, process, and guidelines will be needed whenever the baseline configuration has to be changed.
Sheltering evacuees and their pets during the 2019 Kincade Fire.
APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

AAR  After Action Report
AFN  Access and Functional Needs
ARC  American Red Cross
CAL FIRE  California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
Cal OES  California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
CNG  California National Guard
COOP  Continuity of Operations Plan
DEM  Department of Emergency Management
DOC  Department Operations Center
DSW  Disaster Service Worker
EMMA  Emergency Management Mutual Aid
EOC  Emergency Operations Center
FAST  Functional Assessment Service Team
GIS  Geographic Information Systems
ICP  Incident Command Post
IMT  Incident Management Team
JIC  Joint Information Center
JIS  Joint Information System
LNU  Sonoma-Lake-Napa Ranger Unit (CAL FIRE)
MHOAC  Medical Health Operational Area Coordinator
OA  Operational Area
PG&E  Pacific Gas and Electric Company
PIO  Public Information Officer
SRA  State Responsibility Area
TAG  The Adjutant General
WEA  Wireless Emergency Alert
APPENDIX B: PG&E POWER SHUTOFF AND KINCADE FIRE TIMELINE

Oct 22, 2019  High winds with historic wind speeds reach area
Oct 23, 2019  Sonoma County EOC activated (8:00am)
Oct 23, 2019  Power shutoff
Oct 23, 2019  Kincade Fire ignited
Oct 24, 2019  County Administrator issue local emergency proclamation for Kincade Fire
Oct 24, 2019  Governor issues state emergency proclamation
Oct 24, 2019  Evacuations affecting 1,655 people
Oct 24, 2019  Kincade Fire at 10,000 acres (7:00pm)
Oct 25, 2019  Power restored
Oct 26, 2019  Shelters opened (1168 sheltered)
Oct 29, 2019  Power shutoff
Oct 29, 2019  Kincade Fire at 74,324 acres (2:00am)
Oct 29, 2019  Evacuations affecting 135,485 people, shelters housing 3,305 people
Oct 30, 2019  Public Health Officer proclaims local health emergency due to Kincade Fire
Oct 31, 2019  Kincade Fire at 76,825 acres
Oct 31, 2019  PG&E restoring gas service to Kincade Fire impacted populations
Oct 31, 2019  Evacuations affecting 3,381 people, shelters housing 858 people
Oct 31, 2019  Weather forecasting below freezing temperatures overnight
Oct 31, 2019  Board of Supervisors ratifies emergency proclamation
Nov 1, 2019  Power restored
Nov 1, 2019  Public Health Officer issues emergency order concerning re-entry and handling/transport/disposal of fire debris
Nov 5, 2019  Board of Supervisors ratifies health emergency
Nov 7, 2019  Kincade Fire controlled
Dec 17, 2019  Board of Supervisors extends emergency proclamation
Feb 11, 2020  Board of Supervisors extends emergency proclamation
APPENDIX C: AFTER ACTION REPORT PARTICIPANTS

Kincade AAR Workshop

- Dan Marincik, Santa Rosa Police Department
- David Boettger, Santa Rosa Police Department
- Josh Ludthe, Santa Rosa Police Department
- Jeff Nicks, Rohnert Park Public Safety
- Celeste Philip, Sonoma County Department of Health Services
- Cecilia Quiambao, City of Petaluma
- Chris Jones, Golden Gate Bridge Highway Transportation District
- Dagny Thomas, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Jeff DuVall, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Lisa Figueroa, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Sonja Moug, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Sam Wallis, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Dan Widger, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Caroline Judy, Sonoma County General Services Department
- John Kessel, Sonoma County Administrator’s Office
- Mickie Tagle, Town of Windsor
- Bill Braga, Sebastopol Fire Department
- Jeff Schach, Petaluma Fire Department
- Paul Lowenthal, Santa Rosa Fire Department
- Tony Gossner, Santa Rosa Fire Department
- Neil Bregman, City of Santa Rosa
- Paul Fleckenstein, CAL FIRE
- Brian Buckhant, CalOES
- Dave Jeffries, City of Sonoma
- Jim Comisky, Sonoma Valley Fire
- Joe Irvin, City of Healdsburg
- Rhea Irvine, City of Healdsburg

Executive Session

- James Gore, Sonoma County Board of Supervisors
- Sheryl Bratton, County Administrator’s Office
- Christel Querijero, County Administrator’s Office
- Janell Crane, Sonoma County Human Resources
- Lisa Figueroa, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Jeff DuVall, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Chris Godley, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
Public Information Officer/Joint Information Center Phone Interview

- Lisa Figueroa, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Jennifer Larocque, County Administrator’s Office
- Melissa Valle, County Administrator’s Office

Kincade Fire After-Action Report Survey

- Joe Irvin, City of Healdsburg
- Christine Jacobs, California Highway Patrol
- Dan Widger, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Management
- Keith Lew, County of Sonoma General Services Department
- Toni Anthony Holland, County of Sonoma General Services Department
- Wayne Wirick, City of Sonoma

Combined Kincade Fire & PG&E Power Shutoff After-Action Report Survey to PIO Team

- Carly Cabrera, County of Sonoma, Department of Emergency Management
- Kris Montgomery, Human Services Department
- Alberto Botello, Department of Child Support Services
- Felicity Gasser, Sonoma County Community Development Commission